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ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSOCIATION

LAW

JUDGES

OF ADMINISTRATIVE

UNDER

FIRE:

LAW JUDGES,

INC.

v.
HECKLER*

The independent association of administrative law judges in the federal Social Security
brought suit against the agency,
Administration*"
alleging that agency officials unlawfully pressured the judges to decide an unrealistic volume
of cases, thereby depriving claimants of due
process and a fair hearing, and further pressured
the judges to decide a fixed percentage of cases
In an opinion filed
in favor of the government.
on March 14, 1983, the District Court (Joyce Hens
Green, J.) 'dismissed the case against the Merit
Systems Protection Board, a co-defendant in the
action, and directed the principal parties to
proceed with the litigation.
The plaintiff's brief, prepared for the
Association by former Secretary Elliot L. Richardson,
Esq., contains an extensive discussion of the
With
factual and legal background of the case.
Mr. Richardson's permission, selected portions of
the brief are reprinted below, in greatly abridged
form.
The Court's opinion is primarily concerned
with the issue of standing, and related procedural
matters.**+ Because these issues are of lesser concern to Journal readers, the opinion has not been
Persons interested in obtaining a
reprinted here.
copy of the opinion, prior to its publication in
the law reports, should communicate with the Clerk
of Court.

Dec. sub. nom. Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. v. Schweiker,
U.S. D. Ct., D.C. Cir., March 14, 1983 (Civ. Action No. 83-0124) (unpub'].).
**

The Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. is not affiliated
with the National Association of Administrative Law Judges, and NAALJ is
not involved in this case in any way.

*

Which

is, of course, entirely proper and judicious in the context of a

motion to dismiss. -

Ed.
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Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
Washington, D.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Elliot L. Richardson, Esq.,
Peter E. Halle, Esq.,
D. Stephen Mathias, Esq.,
John M. Adams, Esq.
on the brief.

/-Excerpts_7

Statement of the Case

The Complaint filed by the Association of Administrative Law Judges,
Inc. ("plaintiff") charges that the defendants are engaging in acts, practices,
and courses of conduct that pressure Administrative Law Judges .("ALJs") in the
Social Security Administration ("SSA') into disposing of large numbers of
cases without regard to the amount of time that must be devoted to each case
in order to give it adequate legal and evidentiary consideration and in order
to render a careful, correct, fair, and impartial written decision, consistent
with the ALJ's and SSA's obligation to treat each claimant in accordance with
due process, and acts, practices and courses of conduct that pressure ALJs
The Complaint further
into deciding fewer cases in favor of claimants.
charges that the defendants instituted removal proceedings in three cases
before the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") and have threatened ALJs
who are members of the Association that they will be "removed or otherwise
penalized" if they do not dispose of more cases and/or decide a greater number
of cases in favor of the government. Moreover, the Complaint charges that
the defendants' acts and practices are injuring ALJs who are members of the
Association because they have a "chilling effect on ALJ's independent performtheir duty to give each claimant fair
ance of their duties . . . /including_/
and impartial consideration .... ..
/More specifically_7, the complaint alleges that defendants have
"threatened" ALJs who are members of the Association that they will be
"removed or otherwise penalized" if they do not speed up consideration of
claimants' cases without regard to their duty and independence to develop a
complete record on which to base a decision. Moreover, it is alleged that
defendants have threatened the Association's member ALJs that if they do not
decide a greater number of cases in favor of the Government, in disregard of
their duty and independence to give each claimant fair and impartial considerThese threats and
ation, they will be "removed or otherwise penalized."

other practices alleged in the complaint are injuring the Association's members
as well as disabled claimants.
The Social

Security Disability Decisional Process Case Production Quotas

. . . The Association's members are primarily engaged in the adjudication of claimants' rights to disability benefits under Titles II and XVI of
the Social Security Act. (42 U.S.C. Sec. 401 et seq. (1981) and 42 U.S.C.
Claimants must meet the Act's strict
Sec. 1381 et seq. (1974), respectively).
definition of disability to be entitled to benefits /-as defined in-/ 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 416(i)(1) (1981).
A disabled person, however, does not have the opportunity to appear
before an ALJ face-to-face to present his or her case until he or she has first
As a result
been denied benefits by the SSA. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.930 (1982).
of a tightening of disability criteria made 'without any change in the law or
any comparable change in the regulations," SSA has been denying an increasing
number of permanently disabled claimants their-statutory right to benefits.
Consequently, appeals to ALJs have increased / drastically-/ . . .
In order to meet the tremendous increase in the demand for face-toface hearings before qualified ALJs, members of the Association have dramatically
increased their production:
During the 1974 fiscal year, the average
dispositions per ALJ were 13 per month.
Over the last seven years, ALJs have been
forced to increase their productivity by
nearly threefold. As of the end of FY
1981, the average ALJ processed 33 disThe Administration
positions per month.
wants to increase average monthly output

to 50.
CHAIRMAN OF HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON THE AGING, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON
IMPACT OF THE ACCELERATED REVIEW PROCESS ON CESSATIONS AND DENIALS IN THE SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 35 (Comm. Print Oct. 1982) ("Report on
Impact") at 41.
A Senate Report highlights an ALJ's testimony regarding the continuing
effort by ALJs to hear the tidal wave of claims by disabled persons:
I issued about 31 decisions per month in
During the first four months of 1982,
1981.
I have averaged 41 dispositions per month.
In April, I closed 59 cases.

I cannot maintain this level of average
monthly decisions for any extended period
of time. . . . I have come to the office

early, have worked on Saturday, traveled
to out of state hearings sites on my own
time, and worked a 70-hour week on a hearing trip to Wisconsin. Judges all over the
country have been making this extra effort
because we wish to accommodate the claimants
waiting for a hearing

. .

.

.

The speed at

which the acceleration process has been
implemented has caused needless misery
across the land. There are not enough ALJs
on duty to quickly cure the problem. The
problem must be cured at it source.
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON OVERSIGHT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION DISABILITY REVIEWS 28 (Comm. Print Aug. 1982) (footnote omitted).
According to the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, another ALJ
testified that a source of the problem is SSA's own failure to fully develop
the record of a claimant's disability at the DDS level. A faulty or incomplete
record many times results in the denial of benefits to disabled claimants
which, in turn, results in increased appeals to qualified ALJs who are duty
bound to carefully develop a complete record on which to base a fair and
impartial decision:
With regard to the speed in which such
review of termination cases are performed,
we have found in a vast majority of the
cases that there has been poor development
of the medical record at the state agency
level.
In all fairness to the state
agencies, we believe that such poor development is due in large part to an extremely
large state agency workload, under-staffing
of the state agencies, and arbitrary time
constraints imposed on the state agencies for
processing cases. .

.

.

The Administrative

Law Judges often feel that the hearing level
has become the "dumping ground" for the
hurried state agency process.
Id. at 29 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).
The HHS defendants' response to this very real problem is simplistic
and unrealistic. "/ GOiven the number of hearing requests and the number of
ALJs, it is a matter of simple arithmetic to calculate the number of dispositions
per ALJ needed ....... " (HHS def' mem. at 33).
The product of this reasoning
is continuing pressure on ALJs to hear cases without regard to the quality of
the record or of the decision.

A Quota for Allowances of Benefits Favorable to Claimants
In 1980, Congress became concerned with the rise in the number of
cases in which ALJs were granting benefits to claimants and the variance among
ALJs in this regard. Congress found that "/ i /n the past there . . . had
been fairly extensive review of ALJ allowances and denials through own-motion
review" and "/ t /his own-motion review has almost been eliminated in recent
years." H.R. REP. NO. 944, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1405.1
In response, Congress enacted a law, commonly known as the "Bellmon
Amendment," that required SSA to implement a program of Appeals Council "own
and to report to Congress on the progress of
motion review" of ALJ decisions
4
the program. Section 30 (g) of the Social Security Amendments of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-265 (discussed at 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 421, historical note, (West's
1982 Supp.)).
The HHS defendants have taken the position in their memorandum that
this amendment gave them carte blanche to single out high allowance judges and
to threaten them with removal or other penalties unless they decide more cases
against claimants. The only authority they cite for this extreme position is
a statement made by Senator Bellmon on the floor of the Senate:
Much of the problem has to do with the
administrative law judge decision-making
process itself, which is highly individualized.
The judges are independent and differ in their
procedural methods on hearings. According to
the Finance Committee's report, the judges
develop and decide cases in very different ways,
some relying heavily on medical' examinations
and others not, and some using vocational
specialists a great deal in deciding cases
while others do not. This has led to a great
degree of variation in reversal rates among
judges. Some have become known as "easy" judges,
others as "hanging" judges. There seem to be more
"easy" judges than ''hanging" judges, however.
The Finance Committee report points out that
87 percent of the judges reversed 46 percent
or more of the cases they heard. This seems to
be an exceptionally high number of judges who
reverse, on the average, almost half the cases
that come before them.
26 CONG. REC. S702 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1980) (cited twice in HHS defs' mem. at
Nothing in Senator Bellmon's remarks, of course, justifies the
5-6 and 42).
threatening of high allowance judges by HHS.
1 ALJ decisions are reviewable by the Appeals Council, 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.967
(1982). A party who disagrees with an ALJ's decision can appeal, or the Appeals
Council may, on its "own motion," review the action of an ALJ. 20 C.F.R. Sec.
404.969 (1982).

Senator Bellmon's remarks themselves, however, were not faithful
to the Finance Committee Report to which he referred. That Report indicated
Senatorial concern with variations in the decisions of hanging judges, easy
judges and average judges alike, as well as variations in the denial rates
by State DDS agencies. According to the Committee Report, 33 percent of the
ALJ corps was made up of "hanging" judges, while only 21 percent were "easy."
Yet, the SSA decided to study and threaten only "easy" ALJs. The Senate Report
indicates that Congress did not intend to give them authority to do so:
A person who requestsa hearing may be
assigned to what have been referred to
as either "easy" or "hanging" judges.
In the period January-March 1979, 33
percent of ALJs awarded claims to from
zero to 46 percent of the disabled
workers whose cases they decided, 46
percent of ALJs awarded claims to from
46 to 65 percent, and 21 percent of ALJs
awarded claims to from 65 to 100 percent ....
The committee is concerned about these
State-to-State, ALJ-to-ALJ variations
and about the high rate of reversal of denials
which occurs at various stages of adjudication, for it indicates that possibly
different standards and rules for disability
determinations are being used at the different
locations and stages of adjudication.
S. REP. NO. 408, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1980),
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1331.2

reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE

The Independence of the ALJ to build a complete
record and decide cases

"/T /he conduct of the hearing rests generally in the examiner's
discretion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400 (1971).
"And if the word
'discretion' means anything in a statutory or administrative grant of power,
it means that the recipient must exercise his authority according to his own
understanding and conscience." United States v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260,
266-267 (1954).
Current Social Security regulations indicate that ALJs have
broad discretion. But such discretion, without the independence to exercise
it within the bounds of the law, is meaningless.
A Social Security disability hearing is a de novo proceeding open to
the parties and other persons that the ALJ "considers necessary and proper."
20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.944 (1982).
The ALJ "looks fully into the issues" and may
2 The State-to-State variation that concerned the Committee was the difference
in the rate of allowance of benefits by state DDS agencies. In FY 1978, for
example, the Alabama DDS allowed 22.2 percent of claims, while the New Jersey
DDS allowed 53.1 percent. Id.

stop the hearing "if he or she believes" there is material evidence missing.
Id. The ALJ may decide "when the evidence will be presented and when the
Id. Even if a claimant waives his or her right to
issues will be discussed."
appear, an ALJ may notify them to appear if the ALJ "believes" that a personal
appearance is necessary to decide the case. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.950(b) (1982).
An ALJ may issue subpoenas at the request of a party or on his or her "own
An ALJ may ask the witinitiative." 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.950(d) (1) (1982).
nesses at the hearing any question material to the issues. 20 C.F.R. Sec.
404.950(e) (1982). The ALJ has an obligation to make a complete record of
the hearing proceedings including any prehearing and post hearing conferences
held to facilitate the hearing or the hearing decision. 20 C.F.R. Secs.
404.951, 404.961 (1982). Lastly, the AU is required to issue a written
decision that sets forth findings of fact and the reasons therefor that "must
be based on evidence offered at the hearing or otherwise included in the
The decision is binding unless
record." 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.953 (1982).
appealed to the Social Security Appeals Council. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.955
(1982).
The Appeals Council can review an ALJ's decision only if:
(1) There appears to be an abuse of
discretion by the administrative
law judge;
(2) There is an error of law;
(3) The actions, findings or conclusions
of the administrative law judge are
not supported by substantial evidence;
or;
(4) There is a broad policy or procedural
issue that may affect the general public interest.
On review, the Appeals Council may consider new
20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.970 (1982).
and material evidence, but claimants do not have the right to appear in person
for face-to-face consideration. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.976(c) (1982).
After review, the Appeals Council is required to decide the case or
remand it to the ALJ. The Council may affirm, modify or reverse the ALJ's
When a case is remanded, the ALJ
decision. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.979 (1982).
is bound to take any action ordered by the Appeals Council and may also take
any other action that is not inconsistent with the Appeals Council remand
order. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.977(b) (1982).

This procedure is in conformity with the requirements of the Admini. . . / . _/
Section ii, /-of the APA / 60 Stat.
237, 244 was enacted to protect ALJs from agency interference and pressures.
It, together with Section 7(b) of the Act, protects the ALJs' independence to
exercise their discretion to build a complete record and to decide cases fairly
and impartially. The two functions are inseparable if independent exercise of
discretion is to have any meaning. Section 7(b) of the Act, now 5 U.S.C.
Sec. 556(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980), provides:
strative Procedure Act3

(c)

Subject to published rules of the
agency and within its powers, employees
presiding at hearings may--(I) administer oaths and affirmations;
(2) issue subpenas /_sic_/ authorized
by law;
(3) rule on offers of proof and receive
relevant evidence;
(4) take depositions or have depositions
taken when the ends of justice would
be served;
(5) regulate the course of the hearing;
(6) hold conferences for the settlement
or simplification of the issues by
consent of the parties;
(7) dispose of procedural requests or
similar matters;
(8) make or recommend decisions in accordance with section 557 of this title;
and
(9) take other action authorized by agency
rule consistent with this subchapter.

Section 7(b), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 556(c), corresponds to the current Social Security
Regulations discussed supra.
The Senate Report on the bill clearly shows Congress' intent in
Section 7(b):
This subsection does not expand the powers of
agencies. It is designed to assure that the
presiding officer will perform a real function

3 Richardson v. Perales, supra, 402 U.S. at 409 held that an earlier version of
these regulations "does not vary from that prescribed by the APA." HHS
defendants concede, for purposes of the motion to dismiss, that Social Security
proceedings are subject to the APA.

rather than serve merely as a notary or
policeman. He would have and should
independently exercise all the powers
The agency
numbered in the subsection.
itself - which must ultimately either
decide the case, or consider reviewing
it, or hear appeals from the examiner's
decision - should not in effect conduct
hearings from behind the scenes where it
cannot know the detailed happenings in the
hearing room and does not hear or see the
private parties.
S. REP. NO. 752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 21 (1945); reprinted in Administrative
Procedure Act Legislative History, S. DOC. NO. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.
(269)
(1946)
hereinafter cited as ('Legislative History") (emphasis
added);
in
see also, H. REP. NO. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1946) reprinted
("They would have and independently exercise all the powers
Legislative History.
listed in the section.")
Once the foundation of a complete record has been built, the ALJ
decides the case.
The cornerstone of the formal
administrative process is the principle
that the decision of the Administrative
Law Judge is an independent intellectual
judgment, based solely upon the applicable
law (including agency regulations and
precedent) and the facts contained in the
recorq. . . . It is the Judge's duty to
decide all cases in accordance with agency
policy.

However, if the parties have introduced
evidence or arguments not previously considered by the agency, or if there are
facts or circumstances indicating that
reconsideration of established agency policy
may be necessary, the Judge has not only a
right but a duty to consider such matters
and rule accordingly.

Although the Judge should follow
agency policy and the law he must always
be aware that he may have the last opportunity
to call the attention of the agency (or the
courts if the agency denies review) to an
If the
important problem of law or policy.
Judge is wrong he can easily be reversed, but
if he is correct he may prevent substantial
inequity and injustice.

M. Ruhlen, Manual For Administrative Law Judges 78-80 (1982)
Administrative Conference of the United States.)

(Prepared for the

Argument
Plaintiff Has Standing To Bring This Action
Plaintiff has standing as an association to bring this action because
its members have suffered a legally cognizable injury at the hands of the
defendants, because proof of the claim asserted will not require individual ALJ
participation in the case, and because the requested relief will inure to the
benefit of all ALJs.
The well-pleaded allegations in the complaint show that plaintiff has
standing on the basis of injury suffered by its members in four respects. In
addition, plaintiff has standing to challenge the denial of the disabled claimants' due process rights.
First, the complaint alleges that three ALJs are the subjects of ongoing removal proceedings before the MSPB. The loss of employment and wages
that would result from their imminent removal is a direct and concrete economic
injury sufficient to confer standing. ...
Second, the complaint alleges that the defendants have threatened ALJs
that they will be removed or otherwise penalized if they fail to obey defendants'
illegal policies. These threats must be viewed as credible in light of the
proceedings currently pending before the MSPB. See Segar v. Civiletti, 516
F.Supp. 314 (D.D.C. 1981) (selective discipline of certain employees sets a
lesson for others). The fact that no other ALJs are currently facing proceedings
before the MSPB does not minimize the impact of this threat. ...
Third, the complaint alleges that the acts, practices, policies and
courses of conduct of the defendants violate the statutory right of its members
to decisional independence under the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act. In Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit found
that ALJs have standing to challenge the alleged infringement of their decisional
independence by HHS.
In Nash, an ALJ filed suit contending that an arbitrary monthly production quota, the establishment of "acceptable" reversal rates, institution
of a peer review program and the use of clerical and managerial personnel for
certain judicial responsibilities constituted an impermissible interference
with the ALJs' statutory independence. The Second Circuit found that the ALJ
had standing to assert the claim:
The APA creates a comprehensive bulwark
to protect ALJs from agency interference.
The independence granted to ALJs is designed
to maintain public confidence in the essential fairness of the process through which
Social Security benefits are allocated by
ensuring impartial decisionmaking. Since
that independence is expressed in terms of

such personal rights as compensation,
tenure and freedom from performance evaluations and extraordinary review, we cannot
say that ALJs are so disinterested as to
lack even standing to safeguard their own
independence.
The holding in Nash that
613 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Ci'r.1980) (per Kaufman, J.).
ALJs are entitled to decisional independence has been adopted by the Fifth
Circuit in Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 1144, 1149 (5th Cir. 1982). See also
N.L.R.B. vs. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527 N.10 (3rd Cir. 19-81).
The defendants' acts, practices, policies and courses of conduct have
a chilling effect on the exercise by ALJs of their right to decisional independence. This chilling effect in and of itself is a sufficient injury in fact
to provide standing: but for the defendants' threats to impose sanctions, ALJs
would exercise fully their right to decisional independence. ...
Fourth, the complaint alleges that the defendants' acts, practices,
policies and courses of conduct constitute injury because they interfere with
the statutory obligation imposed on ALJs under the APA to impartially administer
full and fair hearings. See United States v. Federal Maritime Commission,
No. 79-1299, slip op. (D.C. Cir., Nov. 16, 1982); / citing Coleman v. Miller
7.
307 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1939)2.
The ALJs have standing to raise the constitutional rights of disabled
claimants, because the activities of ALJs are inextricably bound to the due
process rights of the claimants and numerous obstacles and practical difficulties prevent the claimants from asserting their own rights. Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976); Singleton v. Wolff, 428 U.S. I06 (1976). ...
Moreover, SSA claimants may never discover /-that their rights have
been violated_7 because the initial impact of the unl wful actions is on ALJs. ...
This Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Subject
Matter of This Action
/-omi tted-7
The Well-Pleaded Allegations of the Association's
Complaint State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be
Granted.
Defendants' Rating of ALJs' Performance
and Establishment of Production
Quotas Violate the Administrative
Procedure Act.
The complaint alleges that HHS. defendants are collecting statistics
on ALJs' production rates and allowance rates; that they are using those

statistics to rate and evaluate ALJs' performance; that they have used these
ratings to initiate actions before the MSPB and to threaten ALJs with removal
or other penalties; and that defendants are engaging in these and other practices "all of which pressure ALJs to ignore their duty to give each claimant
fair and impartial consideration and have the effect of making ALJs, once
again, mere tools of SSA in violation of the comprehensive scheme of administrative adjudication established in the APA."
For purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted ....
1.

Defendants' Attempted Justifications of
Their Practices Are Not Persuasive

Defendants argue that they are not rating and evaluating ALJs in
violation of the law because the phrase "performance appraisal" is a term of
They state that, even though ALJs are excluded from
art (HHS defs' mem. 35).
performance appraisals under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 4302, SSA may nevertheless collect
data to rate and evaluate their performance in order to initiate removal proMoreover, they assert that "inefficiency
ceedings pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7521.
Of course, the question on a
or incompetence" is "good cause" for removal.
motion to dismiss is whether the allegations of the complaint, not defendants'
characterizations, fail to state a claim.
The defendants' argument principally relies on dicta i n In re Wanda
P. Chocallo, 2 MSPB 23, 27 (1978), aff'd, 2 MSPB 20 (1980), aff'd sub nom.
Chocallo v. Prokop, Civil Action No. 80-1053 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 198O), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982), and comments in a House Ways
and Means Committee report on a bill that did not become law, H.R. REP. NO.
617, Part 1, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1977) (HHS Defs' mem. 37-38).
First, even if one adopts defendants'
Defendants' argument must fail.
semantic quibble that "performance rating" is a term of art under 5 U.S.C.
Sec. 4302, which exempts ALJs from performance appraisal, defendants have not
"An agency
addressed 5 C.F.R. Sec. 930.211 (1982), which expressly states:
Moreover,
shall not rate the performance of an administrative law judge."
(See,
defendants have not addressed the legislative history of the APA.
Defendants' Threats and Pressures Directed at High Allowance Judges Violate
Second, despite defendants' reliance, Chocallo did not conthe APA, infra.)
sider whether "incompetence" was "good cause" for dismissal.
The Office of Hearings and Appeals of
the Social Security Administration sought
Its
plaintiff's removal on June 20, 1977.
Letter of Charges made three claims: (1) the
defiance of an Appeals Council's order, (2)
refusal to relinquish a case file when requested to do so, and (3) a lack of judicial
temperament.
Chocallo, supra, Slip. Op. at 2. Moreover, the court did not cite any authority
for its statement, in dicta, that an ALJ is not immune from review for

Id. at 3. Thus,
in the performance of his or her duties."
"incompetence...
defendants' reliance on Chocallo is misplaced, particularly in light of the
complaint in this case, which has nothing to do with incompetence. Third,
the statement in COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, REPORT ON CONVERSION OF TEMPORARY
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, H.R. REP. NO. 617, Part 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1977), which defendants cite as approving their actions, in no way authorizes
or legalizes them. The legislation referred to did not pass and did not conMoreover,
cern the issue of "good cause" removal under 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7521.
another report on the bill is contrary. COMMITTEE ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL
SERVICE, REPORT ON CONVERSION OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES, H.R.
REP. NO. 617, Part 2, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 6 (1977) provides that:
An ALJ appointment is, in essence, a
Removal of an ALJ whose
life time job.
performance is not up to par is extremely
difficult, i/ f / not impossible (in the
past 30 years, two ALJs have been removed).
Thus, the authorities upon which the defendants principally rely
do not support their argument with respect to performance appraisals.
2.

The APA was Enacted to Safeguard ALJs From
Pressures and Threats Such as Those Alleged
in the Complaint.

Defendants attempt to state the legal issues in this case as whether
HHS can "encourage" its ALJs to decide more cases per month and whether an
In fact, however, defendants do not even
ALJ can be removed for incompetence.
that by
address the allegation that is at the heart of plaintiff's claim:
establishing production quotas and removing and threatening ALJs for failing
to meet those quotas, HHS has eroded the independence of ALJs to conduct and
decide disability claims in violation of the APA and the Social Security regulations themselves. ...
The roots of this independence requirement are found in the history
of the APA. As more fully indicated below, one of the most important decisions
made by Congress in enacting the Act was to prohibit agencies from controlling
or influencing ALJs by using efficiency standards to rate them and to remove
them.
Prior to the 1946 enactment of the APA, hearing examiners (the forerunners of today's ALJs) were mere agency employees subject to the same
influences as other employees. They, like other federal employees, were
covered by the Classification Act of 1923, ch. 265, 42 Stat. 1488. That act
provided in section 9 that "dismissals for inefficiency shall be made by heads
"
of departments in all cases whenever the efficiency ratings warrant ...
The Civil Service Board was to develop a uniform system of efficiency ratings
setting forth the degree of efficiency constituting grounds for dismissal.
Promotions and salary increases were also based
Id. Sec. 9, 42 Stat. 1490-91.
on efficiency. See Act of August 1, 1941, ch. 346, Sec. 2, 55 Stat. 613, 614
Hearing examiners were thus dependent
(amending Classification Act of 1923).
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upon their employer, and "many complaints were voiced against the actions of
the hearing examiners, it being charged that they were mere tools of the
agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads in making their proposed
findings of fact and recommendations."
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners
Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1953).
See also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339
U.S. 33, 36-41, modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950).
Despite the widely perceived need for reform, different proposals
were before Congress for more than ten years prior to passage of the APA.
H.R. REP. NO. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in APA Legislative History,
235, 241 ("Legislative History").
More than a dozen different bills were
considered.
S. REP. NO. 758, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. (1945), reprinted in
Legislative History, supra, 187, 188. All recognized that hearing examiners
should be accorded some measure of independence from the agencies for which
they decided individual cases. But there was disagreement as to how to
structure it.
See, e.g., Report of Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, summarized in Legislative History, supra, at 68, 70 ("Attorney
General's Report").
The many differences among the various reform proposals
are irrelevant except insofar as they relate to proposed grounds for removal
of hearing examiners.
Bills containing forerunners of section II of the APA can be divided
into two categories.
The first group is well illustrated by the Celler Bill,
H.R. 184, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. Sec. 302(5), reprinted in Legislative History,
supra, at 131, 135:
(a) Upon charges,
the agency that he
feasance in office
inefficient in the

first submitted to him, by
has been guilty of malor has been neglectful or
performance of duty. ...

Accord H.R. 1206, 79th Cong., ist Sess Sec. 308(c)(3)(b), reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at 161, 172. The second category contains language
that was ultimately enacted:
Examiners shall be removable by the agency
in which they are employed only for good cause
established and determined by the Civil Service
Commission...
APA Sec. I1, 60 Stat. at 244; accord H.R. 339, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. Sec.
6(a)(3)(4), reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at 139, 142; H.R. 1203,
79th Cong., Ist Sess. Sec. 7(a,
reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at
155, 158; H.R. 2602, 79th Cong., Ist Sess.
ae 1(a)(
)(D), reprinted in
Legislative History, supra, at 176, 182 ("To insure the impartiality of hearing
or deciding officers
the case shall be heard /-by / (0) examiners
.
who . . . shall be removable only after hearing for good cause shown .
The first category, which clearly would have allowed removal based
on charges of inefficiency, paralleled the language and standards of the
Classification Act of 1923, supra. One of the evils that Congress sought to
remedy by enacting the APA, however, was the agencies' exercise of unhealthy

control over hearing examiners. The Classification Act of 1923 was responsible
for the dependence of the examiners in the first instance, and the APA therefore specifically exempted examiners from being rated according to efficiency
standards by their agencies as provided in the 1923 act. See APA Sec. 11.
Congress considered and rejected bills that would have allowed agencies to remove hearing examiners on the grounds of inefficiency.
Congressman Francis Walter, a member of the House Judiciary Committee
and intimately involved in the drafting of the APA, stated that section 11 of
the APA was "/o/ne of the /-Act's-/ most controversial proposals." Remarks
of Rep. Walter, May 24, 1946, reprinted in Legislative History, supra, at 371.
He continued:
It is often proposed that examiners
should be entirely independent of agencies,
even to the extent of being separately
appointed, housed, and supervised. At the
other extreme there is a demand that examiners
be selected from agency employees and function
merely as clerks. In framing this bill we
have rejected the latter view, as the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure
throughout the greater part of its final report
rejected it, and have made somewhat different
provision for independence. Section 11 recognizes that agencies have a proper part to play
in the selection of examiners in order to secure
personnel of the requisite qualifications. However, once selected, under this bill the examiners are made independent in tenure and compensation by utilizing and strengthening the
existing machinery of the Civil Service Commission.
Id.
Thus, language that would have allowed agencies
their examiners by rating their efficiency was dropped by
the "good cause" standard, and agencies were specifically
of the enacted APA from applying the Classification Act's
of their hearing examiners.

to continue to control
Congress in favor of
barred by section 11
efficiency standards

Regulations implementing the APA were promulgated in 1947. Section
34.8 of title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations provided that agencies shall
12 Fed. Reg. 6321, 6323-24 (1947).
not rate the efficiency of hearing examiners.
Current regulations are essentially identical. 5 C.F.R. Sec. 930.211 (1982).
to exempt ALJs from being
interpreted
been
Thus, the APA has consistently
rated by their agencies under efficiency rating schemes established for other
federal employees.
In 1980, bills were introduced into Congress as part of President
Carter's regulatory reform effort. One bill, H.R. 6768, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,

proposed to repeal 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7521 and to institute instead a comprehensive system for the selection, appraisal and removal of ALJs. The proposal
would have amended title 5 by adding a chapter related solely to ALJs.
8
Section 07(c) of the proposed chapter would have allowed removal based on
a charge of inefficiency or underproductivity:
(c)(l) The performance appraisal
system established by the Board shall provide for --

(A) establishing performance standards
which will, to the maximum extent feasible,
permit the accurate evaluation of job performance on the basis of objective criteria
related to the administrative law judge
position being evaluated;
(B) communicating to each administrative law judge, at the beginning of each
appraisal period, the performance standards
and the critical elements of the judge's
position;

(C) evaluating the performance of each
administrative law judge at least once every
6 years;
(D) assisting administrative law
judges in improving performance; and
(E) procedures for ordering the reassignment, reduction in grade or pay, suspension, or removal of administrative law
judges for unacceptable performance.
H.R. 6768, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 807(c) (1980), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO.
1186, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980).
(Subsequent citations will be to the
bill's section number and the report's page number).
In its statement on the bill, the House Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, which recommended passage, stated:
Existing law has created an undesirable
void in federal personnel management, as it
affects ALJs, especially in the area of performance accountability. In an understandable
attempt to insulate ALJs (who are charged with
being fair and impartial in their official
actions) from any possible pressure by their
employing agencies, the Administrative Procedure Act and later related laws exempted
them from normal agency personnel management
procedures, including agency performance
appraisal systems, but failed to assign many

of these functions-especially performance
So, today,
appraisal-to any other body.
the agencies do not evaluate the performance
of their ALJs, and neither does anyone else.
H.R. REP. NO. 1186, supra, at 6-7. Thus, at least in Congress' view, the current
version of the APA does not permit agencies to rate ALJs and to seek their
In the committee's view, section
removal based on unsatisfactory performance.
807 would have provided "for the first time since enactment of the Administrative Procedures Act, a system for periodic appraisal of, and disposition of
Id. at 15 (emphasis
complaints about, administrative law judge performance."
added).
However, the bill did not pass.
The legislative history of section II of the APA shows that Congress
intended to insulate ALJs from any agency attempts to control them through
Proposals to modify current
disciplinary actions based upon agency ratings.
law further support the conclusion that current law prohibits agencies from
seeking to remove or discipline ALJs based upon agency efficiency standards.
Of course, Congress did not intend to protect grossly inefficient
judges, but rather, it intended to enact remedial legislation to safeguard the
ALJs'independence to develop a complete record pursuant to APA section 7(b),
42 U.S.C. Sec. 556(c), and to render an independent decision free from the types
Subsequent judicial
of agency threats and pressures alleged in the Complaint.
consideration confirms that view of Congressional intent.
Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1973), involving the
question of whether the forced retirement of an ALJ required the opportunity
In discussing section 11,
for a hearing set forth in section II of the APA.
the court stated that "one of the principal problems sought to be corrected
by section 11 was the power of an agency to exert pressure on a hearing examiner
Id. at 1022. The court also stated
by threatening his removal or discharge."
that "the APA was a sweeping piece of remedial legislation /-that-/ . . . should
be given a broad and generous interpretation in light of the objectives sought
Id.
to be accomplished."
The Supreme Court again addressed the purpose of the APA in Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), a case concerning,.inter alia, the scope of
judicial immunity to be accorded to ALJs. The Court observed that "the role
of the modern / ALJ / . . . is 'functionally comparable' to that of a judge."
Id. at 513. Provisions in the APA such as section i were "designed to guarantee
Id. at 514; accord NLRB v. Permanent
the independence of hearing examiners."
Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527-28 (3d Cir.-1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1432.

(1982).
In Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), the court held that
an ALJ had standing to challenge an agency's attempts to improve productivity
and remove underproductive ALJs. The court remarked that "the APA creates a
comprehensive bulwark to protect ALJs from agency interference. The independence
granted to ALJs is designed to maintain public confidence in the essential
fairness of the process through which Social Security benefits are allocated
Id. at 16.
by ensuring impartial decisionmaking."

Defendants' Threats and Pressures Directed
at High Allowance Judges Violate the APA.
HHS defendants' second argument asserts that their Bellmon review
program authorizes them to threaten and pressure high allowance judges.
"The Bellmon Amendment was intended to study this problem and, if warranted,
(HHS defs' mem. 44) (emphasis
correct high reversal rates more directly."
added). The Complaint, however, does not mention Bellmon review. It alleges
that "OHA has threatened other ALJs who are members of the Association that
they will be removed or otherwise penalized if they do not . . . decide a
greater percentage of cases so as to deny benefits to claimants."
The Bellmon amendment, as offered and passed on the Senate floor
reads:
(g) The Secretary of Health, Education,
and Welfare shall implement a program of
reviewing, on his motion, decisions
rendered by administrative law judges
as a result of hearings under section
221(d) of the Social Security Act; he
shall report to the Congress by January I,
1982 on his progress, in his report, he
shall indicate the percentage of such
decisions being reviewed and describe the
criteria for selecting decisions to be reviewed
and the extent to which such criteria take
into account the reversal rates for individual administrative law judges by the Secretary
(through the Appeals Council or otherwise),
and the reversal rate of State agency determinations by individual administrative judges.
The amendment was modified by
126 Cong. Rec. S719 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1980).
the conference committee that resolved differences between the House and Senate
As enacted, the amendment reads:
versions of the bill.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services
shall implement a program of reviewing,_on
his own motion, decisions rendered by / ALJ's-/
. . . and shall report to Congress by January 1,
1982, on his progress.
Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, Sec. 304(g),
94 Stat. 441, 456.
In support of his amendment, Senator Bellmon remarked "/-w-/e need
a method to review the decisions made by the judges so that there is greater
consistency among different judges and better assurance that disability
awards are not being granted inappropriately in a large number of cases."
126 Cong. Rec., supra, at S720. Senator Bellmon continued:

The Secretary already has authority
to review and reverse . . . decisions by

Federal administrative law judges. By
regulation, the Secretary has set up an
appeals council to handle this responsibility. This council reviews cases
appealed beyond the ALJ level by applicants
who are turned down by ALJ's. Until 1975,
the appeals council also reviewed a selection
of ALJ decisions that were not appealed. In
other words, the council selected and reviewed some decisions in which ALJ's reversed
State denials. The appeals council could
reinstate the State decision if it found the
ALJ's reversal to be inappropriate.
The appeals council stopped making
these so-called "own motion" reviews in
1975, apparently because of workload problems.
Id.

(emphasis added).

The plain language of the Beilmon amendment and the remarks excerpted
above make clear that the amendment was only intended to increase "own motion"
review of ALJ decisions by the Appeals Council as already provided in SSA's
regulations. The amendment simply did not authorize HHS to take steps outside
its own regulations to put pressure on ALJs which undermine their independence
to decide cases in a fair and impartial manner. The amendment does not provide that HHS can threaten ALJs with whom it disagrees. ...
Fairness is an essential requirement for decisionmaking under the
APA. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 556(b) (1982).
"One who stands to gain or lose personally
by a decision either way is disqualified by reason of interest to participate
in the exercise of judicial functions."
3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
Sec. 19.6, (2d ed. 1980). Defendants, in attempting to respond to Congressional
concern about the allowance rate among ALJs, have created a situation in which
an ALJ has an interest in deciding claims a certain way.
HHS' program creates an incentive for an administrative law judge to
keep his allowance rate below a certain level, and, therefore, to decide
against claimants in a certain percentage of cases irrespective of the merits
of the particular claim. It inevitably introduces the self-interest of the ALJ
into a situation that should be free of such self-interest. It is, therefore,
incompatible with the APA's fundamental requirement that the decisionmaker
reach a fair and just result based on the merits. Because the program is
designed to result in a higher level of denials by ALJs, its use displays HHS'
naked intent to turn ALJs into the sort of agency "tools" that was the purpose
of the APA to eliminate. See Nash, supra.
It is clear that defendants' own authorities do not support the legality
of their efforts to pressure ALJs into deciding more cases against claimants.

/S /tatistical analysis of error-prone
characteristics of judges or cases may
suggest that / HHS /should focus its
attention on particular ALJs as prospective
sources of errors.
If it were decided to
reinstitute a substantial measure of ownmotion review, a similar focus on the errorprone type of case would also be appropriate.
This may give rise to the fear that judges
will feel pressured to conform their output
to the statistical norm in order to avoid
more frequent searching review.
One way to mitigate this problem is
to select error-prone cases for review on
the basis of the characteristics Of the
case rather than the characteristics of the
ALJ who decided it.
J. Mashaw, C. Goetz, F. Goodman, W. Schwartz, P. Verkuil, & M. Carrow, Social
Security Hearings and Appeals 120 (1978) (emphasis added).
These authorities
concluded:
We believe, however, that it is likely except for apparently unacceptable changes,
such as . . . use of a reversal quota that these efforts will leave a substantial
residuum of variance among the ALJ Corps.
Id. at xxi -

xxii

(Summary and Conclusions).

Lastly, defendants assert that 5 U.S.C. Sec. 554(d)(l) is the only
"arguable" restraint on their efforts.
The allegations of the Complaint, however, are not so limited. They call into question defendants' pervasive efforts
to interfere with the independence of ALJs.
These efforts, as alleged in the
Complaint, state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Defendants' Practices Violate Claimants'
Rights to Due Process of Law
ALJs continue to do their best to provide claimants with a meaningful hearing, but defendants' actions subject them to pressure not to do so.
Abandoning concern for the due process concerns of claimants, HHS simply divides
the number of new claims filed per month by the number of ALJs to determine the
number of cases that an ALJ must decide. No consideration is taken of whether
the system can meet its statutory and constitutional requirements at that level
of production.
The due process clause requires more than merely a formal hearing.
In Diabo v. Secretary of HEW, the Court of Appeals for this Circuit reversed
and remanded a district court's summary judgment affirmance of a denial of
social security benefits on the grounds:

that the proceedings before the administrative law judge did not constitute a full
and fair hearing of his claim for di-sability
benefits. We hold that the administrative
hearing did not comply with basic requirements of fairness and procedural due proThe administrative law judge
cess .
. .
has the power and duty to investigate full.y
all matters in issue, and to develop the
comprehensive record required for a fair
determination of disability. Daniels v.
Mathews, 567 F.2d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 1977);
Coulter v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 224, 229
(3rd Cir. 1975); Clemons v. Weinber er,
416 F. Supp. 623, 625 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
Federal regulations prescribing the conduct
of disability hearings declare that the
'presiding officer shall inquire fully
into the matters at issue and shall receive
in evidence the testimony of witnesses
and documents which are relevant and
material to such matters." 20 C.F.R. Sec.
This duty to probe and
404.927 (1979).
explore scrupulously all the relevant facts
is particularly strict when the claimant,
as here, is not represented by an attorney.
Gold v. Secretary of HEW, 463 F.2d 38, 43
(2d Cir. 1971) ...
627 F.2d 278, 281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

...

In addition, the right to due process requires that the circumstances
of the adjudication be compatible with the judicial function. The Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that "due process demands impartiality on the
part of those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities." See, e.g.,
Schweiker v. McClure, 102 S. Ct. 1665, 1670 (1982). As the Court stated in
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955): "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of
actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored
to prevent even the probability of unfairness." A conflict of interest or other
reason for disqualification rebuts the presumption of impartiality. Id. As
demonstrated above in the preceding section, defendants' creation of an incentive
to reach a particular result on a claim compromises the requisite impartiality.
It is also clear that "to perform its high function in the best way
Id....... Thus, a pro'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' "
ceeding must clearly appear to be just as well as be just. Hearings held under
extreme productivity and other pressures cannot appear just to disabled Social
Security claimants who endure considerable personal hardship to be present at
and participate in their hearings. An adjudicative system in which the adjudicators appear to be pressured beyond reason to produce decisions, and in which
the judge has an interest in the result, cannot satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution.

